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Abstract
This paper studies the costs and benets of delegating decisions to superiorly
informed agents, that is of adopting exible contracts, relative to the use of rigid,
non discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of
the costs of delegation, primarily agency costs, versus their benets, primarily the
exibility of the action choice in two dierent environments, one with risk and one
with ambiguity.
We rst determine and characterize the properties of the optimal exible con-
tract. We then show that the higher the agent's degree of risk aversion, the higher
is the agency costs of delegation and the less protable a exible contract relative
to a rigid one. When the parties have imprecise probabilistic beliefs, the agent's
degree of imprecision aversion introduces another agency cost, which again reduces
the relative protability of exible contracts.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. A central problem in organizations is the fact that, as argued by Jensen
and Meckling (1992), agents assigned a given task may end up having, at the time they
have to act, some superior information on the suitability of the various actions which can
be taken to perform the assigned task. As a consequence, it may be desirable, in order to
enhance the performance of the organization, to grant agents some degree of discretion
in their choice of which action to undertake, or to ask them to report their information
before specifying which action should be carried out. The obvious diculty in doing this
is that the interests of such agents may not be aligned with those of the organization. This
diculty can be mitigated and possibly eliminated with the use of appropriate monetary
transfers to the agents, that is of appropriate compensation contracts. For such contracts
to work, some risk must be typically shifted to the agents. If agents are risk averse, doing
this is costly. Moreover, if the nature of the possible realizations of the uncertainty is
not clearly understood a priori, either because some unforeseen contingencies may arise
or because the probabilities of the possible events may be `ambiguous,' some further
diculties and costs arise.
The presence of these costs implies that, in the decision of whether or not and to
which extent to delegate to an agent the choice of which action to undertake, a trade-o
is faced. The broader the uncertainty about the environment in which the agent takes his
action, the more important is for the organization the fact that the `right' action is taken
in each possible circumstance, and the higher are the benets of delegating the choice to
the agent, that is of oering him a contract granting some exibility in his choice. But
the extent and nature of this uncertainty also aect the costs of delegation. These costs
depend on the risk aversion of the agent, as well as on the degree of `ambiguity' of such
uncertainty and the attitude towards it exhibited by the agent. When such costs are
suciently high it might be preferable to opt for a dierent type of contract, which does
not delegate the action choice to the agent.
The issue is important, as this trade-o naturally arises when the architecture of
organizations is evaluated. The main focus of this paper is the analysis of this trade-
o, in particular of how the cost of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents
varies with the structure of the uncertainty and the agents' attitude towards risk and
uncertainty.
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Model and results. We consider a simple contracting situation between a principal
and an agent. The agent must take a costly action which generates some revenue for
the principal. Before taking his action, but after signing the contract, the agent receives
a private signal over the productivity of the various actions. The action chosen by the
agent is not observable by the principal but we assume that, at the time of contracting,
the principal has the ability to predene the set of actions, or possible tasks, available
to the agent. Thus the principal could specify a determinate action the agent must
undertake in all the possible circumstances he may have to act - what we will call a
rigid, or non discretionary, contract.1 Alternatively, the principal could leave the agent
some discretion in his choice, so that the action the agent undertakes may vary with the
information received - a exible contract.
The agent incurs a (deterministic) cost in order to undertake each of the possible
actions. Hence, in the absence of monetary transfers contingent on the realization of
the principal's revenue the interests of the principal and the agent may not be aligned
as the latter would always choose the least costly action among those available to him.
A exible contract must therefore include a suitably designed compensation scheme, in
order to induce the agent to take the revenue maximizing action for each realization of
the signal. But such variability in compensation may generate agency costs. In contrast,
a rigid contract is simpler, does not need to rely on high-powered incentives and never
entails agency costs.
Given the important role played by the uncertainty faced by the parties concerning
future events, we will consider and compare two dierent specications of the parties'
information and attitude towards this uncertainty. Consider rst the case where principal
and agent have common and sharp probabilistic beliefs about the possible circumstances
in which the agent will have to act and about the productivity of the dierent actions.
In this environment, if the agent is risk neutral,2 agency costs are zero and the optimal
exible contract always dominates, at least weakly, the rigid contract. This is no longer
true if the agent is risk averse, as then agency costs arise. We characterize the optimal
exible contract when the agent has CARA preferences, so as to be able to isolate the
eects of changes in the agent's degree of risk aversion. We nd that at the optimal
1The possibility of imposing such restrictions was earlier considered in various papers starting with
Holmstrom (1984) (see Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Armstrong and Vickers (2009) for some recent
contributions) in which actions are assumed observable and no monetary transfers are allowed.
2We assume the principal is always risk neutral.
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exible contract the agent's compensation also depends on the agent's report over the
signal received and that the agent's utility is not equalized across dierent realizations
of the signal. Also, an increase in the agent's degree of (absolute) risk aversion implies a
larger agency cost, and hence a lower protability for the principal of a exible contract
relative to a rigid contract. Thus, there is a threshold level for the agent's degree of
risk aversion, above which a rigid contract dominates a exible one and below which the
opposite is true.
We next turn our attention to environments in which the information available to the
parties concerning the possible events in which the agent is called to act is not precise
enough to pin down a single probability distribution; i.e. there is ambiguity. This might
for instance be the case if the circumstances under which the agent may have to choose an
action are totally new, with almost no information available. Or it might be due to the fact
that these circumstances are hard to describe in full detail. We model this fact by assuming
that principal and agent have a common {i.e., objective{ set of probabilistic beliefs over
the likelihood of these events. Following Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008),
we call `imprecision' such set of beliefs and `imprecision averse' a decision maker who
reacts pessimistically to such imprecision, and `imprecision neutral' a decision maker who
anyway condenses the imprecise set to a single probability.3 Specically, we assume that
the principal is imprecision neutral while the agent is imprecision averse. To single out
the eect of the presence of imprecision, we assume here that both parties are risk neutral
and show that imprecision aversion by itself creates an agency cost. We provide a partial
characterization of the optimal exible contract under imprecision aversion and show that
increasing the agent's degree of imprecision aversion reduces the prots of the optimal
exible contract, making the rigid contract relatively more attractive. We also nd that
the properties of the optimal exible contract under imprecision aversion, in particular
with regard to the variability of the compensation paid to the agent across dierent
realizations of the uncertainty, are dierent from those obtained under risk aversion.
Even though with multiple priors the compensation contract may be designed so that
principal and agent end up `using dierent beliefs' to evaluate it, and hence possibly engage
in mutually benecial speculative trade, we show this is never optimal. This stands in
contrast with the case in which both principal and agent have sharp, but dierent prior
3We remark that with some dierences in interpretation, our analysis could be equivalently cast in the
original maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), or its -maxmin generalization
(e.g., Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004)).
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beliefs, where the surplus generated by the contractual relationship is actually enhanced
by the possibility of exploiting the benets of speculative trade (as in Eliaz and Spiegler
(2007)).
Literature.
The choice between exible and rigid contractual structures in organizations has been
examined in several previous papers. In contrast to our setup, most of these papers focus
on the case where monetary transfers are not allowed and the objectives of principal and
agent are at least partly aligned. In such environments the agent may be willing to freely
transmit some of his private information to the principal. Dessein (2002) investigates the
trade-o between contracts where the choice of the action is delegated to the agent and
contracts where the principal retains the control over such choice, but uses the information
that is reported to him by the agent. He examines in particular how such trade-o
varies with the degree of congruence between the objectives of the principal and the
agent. Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Szalay (2005) study the consequences, on the agent's
incentives to invest in acquiring information, of delegating {possibly only partial{ control
over the action choice to the agent .
The closest paper to ours is Prendergast (2002). Like us, he considers an environment
in which monetary transfers are allowed, the structure of information is given and the
agent has superior information. In his set-up the agent is risk neutral like the principal,
and agency costs are exogenously given (as xed `monitoring costs'). He examines how the
relative benets of exible and rigid contracts vary with respect to the magnitude of the
uncertainty facing the agent, that is to the variability in the possible situations in which
he may nd himself to act. In contrast, our main focus is the endogenous determination
of the agency costs, how they vary with the agent's attitude to uncertainty, and their
eects for the properties of the optimal contract.
Following up on Prendergast's work, Baker and Jorgensen (2003) study the eects on
the steepness of the agent's incentives of the precision of the signal privately observed
by the agent on the productivity of his eort. The analysis is carried out in a CARA
normal environment, restricting attention to linear compensation contracts which only
depend on the output level. They nd that the steepness of the incentives increases with
the volatility of the signal. We consider a simpler environment, in which it is possible to
characterize the optimal contract without imposing restrictions on its functional form; we
also allow the contract to depend on the agent's report over his information. Moreover,
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the main focus of our analysis is on the trade-o between exible and rigid contracts
rather than the steepness of incentives. Raith (2008) considers an environment where
the agent has superior information over the productivity of its eort, while his eort is
observable. The main goal of his analysis is the characterization of the optimal contract,
again restricting attention to linear compensation contracts in both eort and output.4
In contrast, in our set-up the agent's action is only observable when it is predetermined,
that is, with no delegation.
A rather dierent characterization of the trade-o between rigidity and exibility is
provided by Hart and Moore (2008), where the main cost of delegation lies in the variabil-
ity of the outcome prescribed by the contract and the deadweight losses this generates.
The eects of ambiguity or imprecision in the probabilistic beliefs concerning the
possible realizations of the environment faced by parties in contractual situations have
been rst examined by Mukerji (1998) and Ghirardato (1994). Mukerji (1998) studies
a vertical relationship problem, using the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler
(1989). He shows that, as a result of ambiguity aversion, the optimal contract might be
incomplete and, dierently from our setup, exhibit low powered incentives. Ghirardato
(1994) looks at a standard moral hazard problem where parties' `beliefs' are non-additive
and reect ambiguity aversion: each action taken by the agent induces a non-additive
distribution on outcomes. While he also discusses the nature of agency costs in such
environment, he does not address the question of delegation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the environment. Section
3 presents the contracting problem under risk, characterizing its solution and outlining
the trade-o between exible and rigid contracts. Section 4 extends the analysis to the
case where the parties do not have precise probabilistic beliefs. Section 5 oers some
concluding remarks. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The set-up
We consider a contractual relationship between a principal, say a rm, and an agent, say
a worker. The worker has two possible actions, x and y. The output generated by each
action is uncertain: it can be either high ( R) or low (R). The probability of the dierent
4See also Rantakari (2008).
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output realizations when a certain action is undertaken is also uncertain and depends on
some event  2 f1; 2g.
The realization of the output is publicly observable while the action chosen by the
agent is only privately known to him. Furthermore the realization of , describing an
event aecting the probability of success (high output) of the dierent possible actions,
is privately observed by the agent before his action is chosen. It is not observed by the
principal nor by any third party. To begin with, we examine the case where both principal
and agent have sucient information over the process generating this uncertainty, and are
thus able to come up with a sharp probabilistic belief over it. Let p denote their common
belief concerning the occurrence of 1 and (x; ) (resp. (y; )) denote the probability
that R = R in event  when action x (resp. y) is chosen.
The contract is written before the realization of any source of uncertainty (i.e., before
the output and  are realized). Although the action undertaken by the agent is not
observable, we assume that, at the time the contract is signed, the principal can impose
some restrictions over the set of actions available to the agent. To understand the nature
of these restrictions we can think, for instance, of a situation where the principal can
decide to install either only one software program on the agent's computer (in which case
only one action is available to the agent) or dierent types of software. In the latter case
the agent is free to choose which software to use (x or y) to perform the task and his
actual choice is not observable. Also, the fact that such restrictions can only be imposed
ex ante can be justied if we think of situations where the timing of the resolution of
the uncertainty over , and hence of the action choice, is also uncertain and privately
observed.
In this framework, a contract is a specication of a set of admissible actions A  fx; yg
together with a wage payment w from the principal to the agent, where w can depend on
the realized level of the output and the agent's announcement about the realization of the
event : Let wi (resp. wi) denote the compensation paid to the agent when the output is
R (resp. R) and the (declared) state is i; i = 1; 2:
In particular, we would like to distinguish the case where the full menu of possible
actions is available to the agent, A = fx; yg ; from the cases where only action x - or
only action y - is available to the agent. We refer to the contract in the rst case as a
exible contract, since the agent has the exibility and the discretion to choose the action
he thinks is more appropriate for him (and suitable incentives should be specied in the
7
contract to induce the agent to make a choice also in the principal's interest). In the
second case we say on the other hand the contract is rigid, as it prescribes the agent to
always undertake a given action. The contract can then be of type x or of type y according
to which action is specied.
The time-line is as follows:
t = 0 The contract is signed, specifying the set A of possible actions available to the agent
and his compensation w.
t = 1  is observed by the agent who announces its value to the principal.
t = 2 The agent undertakes an action.
t = 3 Output is revealed
t = 4 Compensation is paid to the agent, according to the realized output level and the
agent's announcement.
Observe that at the time the contract is signed there is symmetric information among
the parties. Asymmetric information will arise at a later stage, when the agent privately
learns the realization of , aecting the protability of the dierent actions, and chooses
then which action to take.
Remark 1 We ignore here the possibility of renegotiation, in particular at t = 1, after
the agent learns the realization of .
The principal is the residual claimant of the output and is risk neutral. His payo,
when action zi 2 A is implemented in state i, i = 1; 2, is given by the expected prot:
p[(z1; 1)( R  w1) + (1  (z1; 1))(R  w1)]
+(1  p)[(z2; 2)( R  w2) + (1  (z2; 2))(R  w2)]
The agent has a non separable5 utility function over the compensation received and
the cost cz of undertaking the action z 2 A that is chosen. In particular, in most of the
paper we will assume the agent is risk averse and exhibits the following preferences:
5A utility function that is non separable in the wage received and the cost incurred allows us to
study the comparative statics properties of the optimal contract with respect to the agent's degree of risk
aversion - one of our objectives. In fact with such a specication the rate of substitution between actions
and wage payments is constant and changes in the curvature of the agent's utility function only capture
changes in the agent's attitude towards risk in his compensation.
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Assumption 1 The agent has a CARA utility function: u(w; z) =   e a(w cz)
a
, with a > 0.
The agent's risk attitude is described by the parameter a. It is then convenient to
state the agent's reservation utility as   e au
a
:
We will also assume:
Assumption 2
i) c  cx   cy > 0,
ii) (x; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 2) > (y; 1),
iii) ((x; 1)  (y; 1))( R R) > c > ((x; 2)  (y; 2))( R R),
iv) 1 (y;1)
1 (x;1)  eac.
Conditions i) and ii) say that action x is both more costly and more productive than
action y. Also, condition ii) together with condition iii) say that the additional produc-
tivity of action x, relative to action y, is uncertain: it is larger in state 1 than in state 2
and this variability in the productivity dierential is suciently signicant that in state
1 the expected revenue net of the cost is higher for action x and in state 2 it is higher
for action y. Hence conditions i-iii) ensure that, if there were no agency problems (that
is, if both  and the agent's action were publicly observed), the optimal contract would
be a exible one, implementing action x in 1 and acion y in 2.
Finally, condition iv) says that in state 1 the productivity dierential of action x
relative to y is suciently large, relative to the utility cost of eort. It ensures, as we
will see, that the agency costs are not too high and hence that the prole of actions x in
1 and y in 2 is implementable even when the state  and the agent's actions are only
privately observed.
In addition, we should point out that condition ii) says that at least one of the two
actions is more productive in state 2 than in state 1: As explained in Remark 3 below,
this property ensures that the agent's private information over the realization of state 
matters, while with alternative specications of the probabilities, still consistent with the
other conditions in Assumption 2 but violating this property, the optimal contract is the
same as when  is publicly observable.
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3 Optimal Contract under risk
3.1 Optimal exible contract
The advantage of a exible contract over a rigid one is that it allows to implement the
action prole that maximizes net revenue, which under Assumption 2 is given by action
x in 1 and y in 2. The cost is that, to implement such an action prole, appropriate
incentive constraints need to be imposed, ensuring that no possible deviation by the agent,
in his action choice and/or reporting over the state, is protable. The optimal contract
implementing this action prole subject to the incentive constraints (to which we will
refer, with a slight abuse of terminology, as the optimal exible contract) is obtained as
solution of the following programme:
max w1;w1; w2;w2 p[(x; 1)(
R  w1) + (1  (x; 1))(R  w1)]
+(1  p)[(y; 2)( R  w2) + (1  (y; 2))(R  w2)]
s.t.8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(IC1)   (x; 1)e a( w1 cx)   (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)   (x; 1)e a( w2 cx)   (1  (x; 1))e a(w2 cx)
(IC2)   (x; 1)e a( w1 cx)   (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)   (y; 1)e a( w1 cy)   (1  (y; 1))e a(w1 cy)
(IC3)   (x; 1)e a( w1 cx)   (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)   (y; 1)e a( w2 cy)   (1  (y; 1))e a(w2 cy)
(IC4)   (y; 2)e a( w2 cy)   (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)   (y; 2)e a( w1 cy)   (1  (y; 2))e a(w1 cy)
(IC5)   (y; 2)e a( w2 cy)   (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)   (x; 2)e a( w2 cx)   (1  (x; 2))e a(w2 cx)
(IC6)   (y; 2)e a( w2 cy)   (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)   (x; 2)e a( w1 cx)   (1  (x; 2))e a(w1 cx)
(PC)   p[(x; 1)e a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)] 
(1  p)[(y; 2)e a( w2 cy) + (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)]   e au
(P flex)
where incentive constraints (IC1),(IC2) and (IC3) ensure that, in state 1, the agent does
not want to deviate by, respectively, misreporting the state, modifying his action, or
doing both. Incentive constraints (IC4), (IC5) and (IC6) ensure the same properties hold
in state 2. (PC) is the participation constraint.
We show in the next proposition that, at a solution to the above problem, only con-
straints (IC3), (IC4) and (PC) bind. We also derive properties of the optimal compensa-
tion scheme.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a exible contract implementing
action x in 1 and y in 2. The optimal contract implementing such a prole is obtained
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as solution of the following simplied problem:
max w1;w1; w2;w2 p[(x; 1)(
R  w1) + (1  (x; 1))(R  w1)]
+(1  p)[(y; 2)( R  w2) + (1  (y; 2))(R  w2)]
s.t. (IC3); (IC4); (PC) holding as equalities and w1  w2, w2  w2
and it exhibits the following properties:
w1  w2 > w2  w1:
Recall that (IC3) refers to the `joint deviation' in state 1 (i.e., announcing instead the
state is 2 and choosing the less costly action y rather than x), while (IC4) only concerns
the mis-reporting deviation of announcing 1 when the true state is 2 (and still do action
y, recommended in 2). The private information about the state expands the agent's
possible deviations and so imposes tighter constraints on the principal, as discussed in
Remark 2 below.
Let u(1) =  (x; 1)e a( w1 cx)   (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) denote the agent's expected
utility at the optimal contract when state 1 occurs; similarly, u(2) =  (y; 2)e a( w2 cy) 
(1   (y; 2))e a(w2 cy) is the utility when 2 occurs. The properties shown in the above
proposition that (IC3) is binding at an optimum and that w2 > w2, together with the
fact that (y; 1) < (y; 2), yield the following important implication:
Corollary 1 At the optimal exible contract, u(2) > u(1).
Thus even though the cheaper action y is implemented in state 2 the optimal contract
is characterized in that state by a wage that varies with the output realizations. At the
same time, the expected utility of the net compensation paid to the agent is higher in
state 2 than in 1: To understand these features, note that a xed wage in state 2
would be more attractive to a risk averse agent when the actual state is 1 and hence a
deviation consisting in misreporting the true state in 1 and choosing action y becomes
more protable. The variability of w2 allows then to decrease the gains from such a
deviation and hence to decrease the spread in w1 needed to implement
6 x in 1. Similarly,
the higher expected utility in state 2 makes the misreporting deviation in that state less
attractive.
6It can in fact be veried that (IC3), (IC4) and (PC) can all be satised as equality even with a
constant level of w2 - and hence with the same utility levels for the agent in state 2 as in 1 - but this
is not optimal.
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Remark 2 To further understand the determinants of these properties of the optimal
exible contract, it is useful to compare them with those of the optimal contract obtained
when the realization of  is publicly observable while the agent's action is still not observ-
able. The only incentive constraints which apply in this case - the contract still implements
action x in state 1 and y in 2 - are (IC2), (IC5). The problem is thus clearly simpler
and an explicit solution for the optimal compensation scheme can be derived. It is easy to
verify7 that at an optimum in this case the only binding constraint is (IC2), there is a con-
stant wage in state 2; w2 = w2, w1 > w1 and full insurance across states, u(2) = u(1).
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Thus the variability in w2 and in the agent's utility levels across the realizations of  we
found in the optimal exible contract (Proposition 1) is due to the need of addressing
the additional incentive problems arising from the agent's private information over . A
lower variability in w2 could only be achieved, as we already argued, at the cost of a higher
variability of w1.
Remark 3 On the last point above, it is useful to point out that the optimal contract
obtained when  is publicly observable is also optimal when  is not observable but part
ii) of Assumption 2 is replaced by the condition (x; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 1) > (y; 2);
or by (x; 1) > (y; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 2). Under these specications of the probabil-
ities it is still true that x is more productive than y and, under iii), that the additional
productivity of x relative to y is higher in state 1, but now both actions x and y are
more productive in state 1 than in 2: As a consequence, the mis-reporting deviation of
announcing the state is 2 when it is 1 is less protable: it can be veried that in this
case9 all the additional incentive constraints, (IC1, IC3, IC4, IC6) are satised at the
contract discussed in Remark 2. In contrast, this is not true for the specication satis-
fying part ii) of Assumption 2, in which case (IC4) is violated, as well as for the other
possible specications consistent with part iii), where both x and y are more productive in
state 2 than 1; in which case both (IC4) and (IC6) are violated.
7 For a formal statement of the claim and its proof, see the Online Appendix, available at
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Gottardi/.
8In the symmetric case where instead the agent's action is observable but  is not, the only relevant
constraints are (IC3), (IC6), and (PC). It is easy to verify that these constraints are satised if a constant
wage w1 = u+ cx is paid to the agent when he announces 1 and a constant wage w2 = u+ cy when he
announces 2. In this case the agent is fully insured, as his utility in state 1 is equal to that in state 2,
and is independent of the output level. The action prole x in 1 and y in 2 can then be implemented
at no extra cost for the principal.
9See the Online Appendix.
12
3.2 Rigid contracts
The optimal rigid contract implementing a constant action z 2 fx; yg in every state is
obtained as a solution of the following programme (note that the only constraint is given
by (PC), no incentive compatibility constraint appears here as the agent has no discretion
over the choice of his action):
max w1;w1; w2;w2 p[(z; 1)(
R  w1) + (1  (z; 1))(R  w1)]
+(1  p)[(z; 2)( R  w2) + (1  (z; 2))(R  w2)]
(PC) p[(z; 1)e
 a( w1 cz) + (1  (z; 1))e a(w1 cz)]+
(1  p)[(z; 2)e a( w2 cz) + (1  (z; 2))e a(w2 cz)] = e au
(P rig)
Its solution is very simple in the present framework: the wage should be constant
( w1 = w1 = w2 = w2 = wz), at the level determined by the participation constraint, thus
equal to the expected cost of undertaking action z.10 In particular:
i) For the xed x contract, the compensation is wx = u+ cx, and expected prots are:
[p(x; 1) + (1  p)(x; 2)] R + [p(1  (x; 1)) + (1  p)(1  (x; 2))]R  u  cx
ii) For the xed y contract, the compensation is wy = u+ cy, and prots are:
[p(y; 1) + (1  p)(y; 2)] R + [p(1  (y; 1)) + (1  p)(1  (y; 2))]R  u  cy
3.3 The choice between exible and rigid contracts: the eect
of risk aversion
In this section we compare the expected prots of the principal at the optimal exible
contract with the expected prots at the rigid contracts. An important determinant of
the agency cost of implementing a variable action prole is given by the agent's risk
attitude (described, in the case of CARA preferences, by the single parameter a); in
this comparison we focus then on the role played by this feature. As shown above, the
compensation paid at the rigid contracts is a deterministic amount, whatever the agent's
degree of risk aversion. In contrast, at the optimal exible contract the compensation
10The agent is then fully insured. Since a constant action is undertaken, it would not help to make the
payment contingent on the agent's announcement of .
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varies both with  and the output realizations, and hence the degree of risk aversion
matters.
It is useful to consider rst the extreme case where the agent is risk neutral, like the
principal. In such a situation the optimal exible contract is always preferable to the rigid
ones: with this contract the principal can in fact attain the same level of prots as when
all incentive compatibility constraints are ignored, hence agency costs are zero and the
rst best is achieved.
Proposition 2 When the agent is risk neutral the optimal exible contract is rst best
optimal. The expected level of prots is p[(x; 1) R+(1 (x; 1))R]+(1 p)[(y; 2) R+
(1  (y; 2))R]  u  pcx   (1  p)cy and an optimal compensation11 is given by
w1 = u+ cx +
1  (x; 1)
(x; 1)  (y; 2)c (1)
w1 = u+ cx  
(x; 1)
(x; 1)  (y; 2)c
w2 = w2 = u+ cy
In contrast, when the agent is risk averse (a > 0) a risk premium must be paid to
satisfy the incentive constraints, agency costs are then positive. In particular, when a
is suciently large (in particular, higher than the upper bound dened by Assumption
2(iv)) the variable action prole (x; y) is no longer implementable and so rigid contracts
are always preferable.
Besides the comparison of these extreme values of a, where the outcome is clear, we
are also interested here in analysing the relative protability of rigid and exible contracts
for intermediate values of a and how it varies with small changes in the agents' degree
of risk aversion. To this end we need to describe the eects of local changes in a on the
properties of the optimal exible contract. This proves rather complex and no analytic
result can be established.12 Indeed, when trying to disentangle the various eects of risk
aversion, observe rst that increasing amakes the participation constraint, ceteris paribus,
harder to satisfy: such constraint requires that the certainty equivalent of the lottery with
outcomes w1   cx;w1   cx, w2   cy; w2   cy is equal to u, but the certainty equivalent of
this lottery decreases with risk aversion. Consider then the incentive constraints which
11Note that this compensation scheme yields u(2) = u(1).
12The diculties faced in the comparative statics analysis with respect to risk aversion were also
emphasized by Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (1999).
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are binding at an optimum solution, (IC3) and (IC4): each of them requires two distinct
lotteries to have the same expected utility. For (IC4) we can say that the second lottery
that is compared is always riskier than the rst one. Hence increasing risk aversion
loosens this constraint: i.e., if a is increased while the compensation is kept constant, the
constraint becomes slack. On the other hand, in the case of (IC3) we cannot rank, in
terms of riskiness, the two lotteries that are compared.13 Hence, when a increases, (PC)
is harder to satisfy while (IC4) is easier, and the eect on (IC3) is unclear.
Given these diculties in the analysis in the rest of this section we rely on the consid-
eration of a numerical example, where the parameters describing the environment exhibit
the following values:14
a p u R R cx cy (x; 1) (x; 2) (y; 1) (y; 2)
1 .5 1 10 5 1.5 1 .8 .45 .2 .4
Table 1:
Figure 1 shows how the dierence between the expected prots at the optimal exible
contract and the two rigid contracts changes with a: this dierence is monotonically
decreasing. We see in particular that for low levels of risk aversion, the exible contract
is preferable to the two rigid contracts, but as a increases the prot dierential becomes
progressively smaller and eventually, from a  1:6 onwards in the situation considered,
the rigid contract specifying task x for the agent becomes optimal. We should stress that
this pattern is robust to changes in the value of the parameters. Hence these numerical
ndings allow us to assert that agency costs are increasing with the agent's risk aversion15.
Hence we conclude that agency costs are increasing and the advantages of delegation are
decreasing in the agent's degree of risk aversion.
INCLUDE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
13These are ( w1   cx;w1   cx), with probabilities (x; 1); 1   (x; 1); and ( w2   cy;w2   cy), with
probabilities ((y; 1); 1  (y; 1)). We know that w1   cx is the smallest outcome but we do not know
how to rank w1   cx versus w2   cy and the attached probabilities are not the same. Thus, the eect of
changing risk aversion on this constraint is ambiguous.
14The values of the parameters have been chosen so as to satisfy the restrictions imposed by Assumption
2 but are otherwise arbitrary. As commented below in the text, we considered however also several other
possible specications of the parameters satisfying this restriction.
15A similar pattern also obtains when the realization of  is commonly observed: increasing risk aversion
makes the rigid contracts more attractive relative to the exible ones. The prots of the exible contract
when  is observable are strictly higher than when  is only privately observed, and the dierence is
increasing in risk aversion.
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We also nd16 that, in this environment, the wage spread in state 1 (i.e., the dierence
between the compensation paid for the high and low output realizations, w1 w1) is rst
decreasing and then increasing in a while the spread in 2 is always increasing in a. The
utility dierential across states also varies non monotonically with a, rst increasing and
then decreasing.
Summing up the main ndings obtained so far, we have seen that, somewhat counter-
intuitively, the optimal exible contract entails some variability of the wage in the state
in which the less costly (and less productive) action is implemented. This variability is
needed to prevent the agent from misreporting the state when in the good state. There is
also some variability in the utility across states. Quite intuitively, these variability in the
optimal exible contract makes it less attractive the higher the risk aversion of the agent.
4 The choice of delegation with imprecise beliefs
We examine now the case where, at the time in which the contract is written, the in-
formation available to the parties concerning the likelihood of the various events is not
precise enough for them to have a sharp probability belief, i.e., the situation faced by the
parties is suciently new that past data cannot be used to pin down probabilities.
We thus assume in this section that there is a set of probability distributions over
f1; 2g, described by an interval [p; p] of values for the probability p that event 1 occurs.
This set represents the probability beliefs consistent with the available information (precise
information corresponds to a singleton set, p = p). Similarly, for each z 2 fx; yg and
 2 f1; 2g there is an interval [(z; ); (z; )] of possible probabilities that the output
level is R when event  occurs and the action chosen is z. These sets of distributions are
to be interpreted as summing up, for both parties, all the information commonly available
on the uncertainty they face.
4.1 Imprecision, imprecision aversion and the contracting prob-
lem
We need a tractable model of decision under uncertainty in such situations, that allows for
a parametrization of individuals' attitude towards ambiguity (or imprecision, as we call
it) and hence for comparative static exercises. To this end we use the model developed
16See the Online Appendix for further details.
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by Gajdos et al. (2008). In the case of interest here, given the simple two-state structure
of the uncertainty, this model is particularly simple. It says that the preferences of the
decision maker can be represented by a convex combination, with respective weights ;
1   ; of the minimal expected utility (with respect to all possible distributions in the
specied intervals) and the expected utility with respect to a central probability (the
center of the intervals).
More precisely, when the probability of the rst state (1) lies between a lower bound p
and an upper bound p, with p^ =
p+p
2
being the `central' probability, the utility of an action
f is described by minp2[p;p]Epu(f)+(1 )Ep^u(f), where Epu(f) is the expected utility
over the consequences of action f evaluated with beliefs p. Gajdos et al. (2008) provide
an axiomatization of this criterion, showing that the weight  placed on the rst term can
be interpreted as a coecient reecting the decision maker's aversion to the imprecision
represented by the interval [p; p]. The case  = 0 reects imprecision neutrality: the
decision maker acts as if he were an expected utility maximizer with respect to the central
probability in each interval, while  = 1 reects extreme imprecision aversion, with the
decision maker putting all the weight on the least favorable prior.
Remark 4 The model described above can be recast as a `maxmin' model in the sense
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Just consider the minimum expected utility taken over
the set of probabilities that lie in the subinterval [p^   p+p
2
; p^ + 
p+p
2
] of [p; p]. This
subinterval is obtained simply by `shrinking' the original interval describing the set of
probabilities symmetrically towards its center, at a rate equal to the decision maker's
degree of imprecision aversion .
The dierence between the models thus does not lie in the functional form per se,
rather in its interpretation. Here, following Gajdos et al. (2008), we interpret [p; p] as
an objective set of probabilistic models which reects the imprecision in the (common)
information available to the parties. The decision maker then shrinks this set as a result
of his (subjective) aversion to the imprecision (the principal, being imprecision neutral,
shrinks this set in a maximal way and behaves as an expected utility maximizer with
respect to the center of the interval.) In Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the set of priors
[p^   p+p
2
; p^ + 
p+p
2
] is interpreted as the decision maker's subjective perception of the
ambiguity in the problem.
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Remark 5 Because of our two-state setting, the model above is also equivalent17 to an -
maxmin model: minp2[p;p]Epu(f)+(1 )Ep^u(f) / +12 minp2[p;p]Epu(f)+
 
1  
2

maxp2[p;p]Epu(f),
where [p; p] is the ambiguity in the problem and  = (+1)=2 is a measure of the decision
maker's aversion to such ambiguity (with  = 1 representing extreme aversion to ambi-
guity and  = 1=2 representing ambiguity neutrality). Such a model has been axiomatized
by Jaray (1989) in a setup with objective information and Ghirardato et al. (2004) in a
purely subjective setup. Hence, the results below can also be extended to these models.
In this section we assume that both parties are risk neutral. We furthermore assume
that the principal is imprecision neutral. He therefore acts as an expected prot max-
imizer, with respect to the central probability level. The agent, on the other hand, is
characterized by his degree  of imprecision aversion.
The principal's objective function { when implementing the exible contract { is then
to maximize
p^[^(x; 1)( R  w1)+(1 ^(x; 1))(R w1)]+(1 p^)[^(y; 2)( R  w2)+(1 ^(y; 2))(R w2)];
where we use a ^ to denote the `central probabilities,' i.e., p^ =
p+p
2
, ^(z; ) = (z;)+(z;)
2
for each z 2 fx; yg and  2 f1; 2g.
Consider next the agent's incentive constraints. His utility in event 1 when action x
is exerted is given by
 min
(x;1)2[(x;1);(x;1)]
f(x; 1) w1 + (1  (x; 1))w1g+(1 ) [^(x; 1) w1 + (1  ^(x; 1))w1]
As explained above, this can also be expressed as
min
2[^(x;1) (x;1);^(x;1)+(x;1)]
f w1 + (1  )w1g ;
where (x; 1) = 
(x;1) (x;1)
2
.
To simplify notation, denote by I(x; 1) the interval [^(x; 1)   (x; 1); ^(x; 1) +
(x; 1)]. Call `induced belief' the probability that the agent uses to evaluate the wage
prole w1; w1; that is the element of I(x; 1) which minimizes  w1 + (1   )w1: this is
the most pessimistic belief in I(x; 1) to evaluate the given wage prole. This belief will
depend on the ordering of the wages across output realizations (i.e., whether w1 ? w1)
and on the imprecision aversion parameter . The principal, by choosing dierent proles
17Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv (2014) also note this formal analogy.
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of wages can induce dierent beliefs for the agent. An exception is the case where the
principal chooses to fully insure the agent in state 1 ( w1 = w1), as in that situation
the beliefs of the agent are not pinned down uniquely, since all beliefs provide the same
constant evaluation of the wage prole.
Using similar notation for the agent's utility in event 2, and when action y is chosen
in 1 and 2, the expressions of the incentive constraints, analogous to those in (P
flex),
are as follows:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(IC1) min2I(x;1)[ w1 + (1  )w1]  min2I(x;1)[ w2 + (1  )w2]
(IC2) min2I(x;1)[ w1 + (1  )w1]  cx  min2I(y;1)[ w1 + (1  )w1]  cy
(IC3) min2I(x;1)[ w1 + (1  )w1]  cx  min2I(y;1)[ w2 + (1  )w2]  cy
(IC4) min2I(y;2)[ w2 + (1  )w2]  min2I(y;2)[ w1 + (1  )w1]
(IC5) min2I(y;2)[ w2 + (1  )w2]  cy  min2I(x;2)[ w2 + (1  )w2]  cx
(IC6) min2I(y;2)[ w2 + (1  )w2]  cy  min2I(x;2)[ w1 + (1  )w1]  cx
(2)
The participation constraint (PC) takes then the following form:
min
p2[p^ (p);p^+(p)]

p[ min
2I(x;1)
[ w1 + (1  )w1]  cx] + (1  p)[ min
2I(y;2)
[ w2 + (1  )w2]  cy]

 u
where (p) = 
p p
2
. As a solution to all the above minimization problems, we obtain
the system of beliefs induced by the wage prole considered for all states and all possible
action choices.
Finally, it is convenient to reformulate part ii) of Assumption 2 in the present frame-
work as follows:
for all (x; 1) 2 I(x; 1); (x; 2) 2 I(x; 2); (y; 2) 2 I(y; 2); (y; 1) 2 I(y; 1);
we have (x; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 2) > (y; 1)
This ensures that there is no overlap in the intervals I(:; :), and thus that the induced
beliefs (no matter what they are) respect the ordering we imposed in Assumption 2(ii)
where these beliefs were assumed to be precise, single probability distributions18. This is
now a joint assumption on , the imprecision aversion of the agent, and the `amount of
imprecision,' captured by the width of the probability intervals [(z; ); (z; )].
Recalling the discussion in Remark 4, as it should be clear from the specication of
the objective function and the constraints in (2), the analysis carries over to the maxmin
18We refer to Section 2 and Remark 3 for a discussion justifying the focus on beliefs satisfying this
condition.
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expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), with the intervals I(.) taken
as given (rather than derived from some underlying objective function and some level
of imprecision aversion). The value added by the model of Gajdos et al. (2008) is the
possibility of decomposing the ingredients entering the construction of the intervals I(..),
and to distinguish between the `objective' (i.e., intersubjective) measure of imprecision
and the subjective parameter of aversion towards imprecision.
4.2 Optimal contract
In this section we characterize the optimal exible contract under imprecision aversion
and discuss how it diers from the optimal contract under risk aversion.
We provide rst a partial characterization of the optimal exible contract in the present
environment. It is useful to start by conjecturing that the optimal exible contract takes
the following form:
w1 = u+ cx +
1  ^(x; 1)  (x; 1)
^(x; 1)  (x; 1)  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2)c (3)
w1 = u+ cx  
^(x; 1)  (x; 1)
^(x; 1)  (x; 1)  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2)c
w2 = w2 = u+ cy
This is the natural extension to the present environment of the contract which, as we
saw in Proposition 2, allows to attain the rst best in the risk neutral and imprecision
neutral case. Note however that in the presence of imprecision aversion this contract may
no longer be rst-best optimal since it features variability of the wage in state 1 and this,
as we will see in what follows, may entail a loss in social surplus, even if the agent is risk
neutral.
To determine whether and when the wage prole in (3) is indeed an optimal exible
contract, note rst that, at such contract, the incentive constraints (IC3) and (IC4)
in (2) are binding, while the others are slack. The participation constraint (PC) is
also binding. We investigate then whether local deviations from it (d w1,dw1,d w2,dw2),
satisfying (IC3), (IC4) and (PC) as equality19, can increase the expected level of the
principal's prot. We outline in what follows the main steps of the argument, referring to
the Appendix for further details.
19Given the linearity of the constraints in w, this is w.l.o.g..
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Use the system given by the three binding, linear constraints to solve for d w1, d w2, and
dw2 as a function of dw1. At the contract in (3), the beliefs regarding  are indeterminate
since the utility is the same in the two  states, while this may not be true for the
deviations considered. We need to distinguish deviations where dw1 > 0 and those where
dw1 < 0. If dw1 > 0, it can be easily veried that d w1 < 0, d w2 > 0, and dw2 < 0, while if
dw1 < 0, the opposite signs obtain. The induced beliefs are uniquely pinned down by the
two deviations, in dierent {opposite{ ways since the utilities change in opposite ways in
these two cases.
We can now write the change in the prot of the principal as a function of dw1 alone
for each of the two types of deviations described above.20 It is immediate to verify that
the change in the prot is always negative when dw1 < 0. Hence this type of deviation
is never prot-improving for the principal. On the other hand, we show in the Appendix
that the other type of deviation, dw1 > 0 is also not protable only when the following
condition is satised:
1 > p^^(x;1)+(1 p^)^(y;2)[(p^+(p))(^(x;1) (x;1))+(1 p^ (p))(^(y;2) (y;2))]
+(1  p^) [^(x;1) (x;1) ^(y;1)+(y;1)](y;2)[(p^+(p))(^(x;1) (x;1))+(1 p^ (p))(^(y;2) (y;2))][^(y;1) (y;1) ^(y;2)+(y;2)]
(4)
Hence when this condition holds, the optimal exible contract is given by (3).
It is easy to verify that condition (4) is always satised when (x; 1) = 0; that is
when there is no imprecision (as measured by the width of the interval [(x; 1); (x; 1)])
regarding the outcome of action x in state 1. In this situation, where the outcome of
action x in state 1 is precisely assessed, the agent's utility for the compensation contract
is the same as if the agent were not only risk but also imprecision neutral. Since the
agent has no imprecision regarding the consequences of action x in 1; the variability in
the wage in state 1 - necessary to implement x - entails no cost, in terms of lower utility
for the agent which would need to be compensated by the principal, while the wage in (3)
provides full insurance to the agent in state 2 and across states 1 and 2, and hence no
other cost for the agent. The contract in (3) achieves thus the rst best and is the overall
optimal contract, dominating all rigid contracts.
The same property clearly holds in an open interval around the point (x; 1) = 0, and
hence (4) is satised for an open set of values of the parameters describing the economy.
20Note that, given the linearity of the utility function, this local approach is enough to draw global
conclusions.
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In particular, when there is little imprecision on the outcome of action x in state 1, the
utility loss for the agent due to the wage variability in that state is suciently small for
the principal so that fully insuring the agent along the other dimension of the uncertainty
remains optimal. In addition, the contract in (3) is still the optimal exible contract,
dominating the rigid contracts, even though it is no longer rst best and there is now a
positive loss in social surplus.
In contrast, when (p) = (y; 2) = 0 while (x; 1) is strictly positive and not too
small, condition (4) does not hold and so the wage in (3) is not the optimal exible
contract. Recall that (p) = (y; 2) = 0 means there is no imprecision on p - i.e., there
is a known probability of the occurrence of 1, 2 - nor any imprecision regarding the
probability of success in state 2 when y is undertaken. In contrast, (x; 1) > 0 means
that there is imprecision regarding the probability of success in state 1. In this case a
reduction, with respect to the situation in (3), in the wage volatility in state 1 (as in
the considered deviation with dw1 > 0) allows to increase prots, even though the wage
volatility in state 2 increases. When (x; 1) > 0 the agent, when evaluating the wages in
(3), uses in fact dierent beliefs in state 1 from those of the principal, and this leads to a
decrease in the surplus to be shared in that state. On the other hand, given that there is
no imprecision on p nor about the probability of success in state 2 when y is undertaken,
increasing the wage variability in state 2 and across states is of little consequence, since
the agent evaluates his compensation as if risk neutral and imprecision neutral in these
dimensions. The combination of these two facts explain why (3) is not optimal in this
conguration. Clearly it is not possible to bring down to zero the volatility of wages in
1, as some variability in this state is still required to implement action x in that state.
Our ndings are summarized in the next:
Proposition 3 When the parameter values describing the environment satisfy condition
(4), the optimal exible contract is given by (3). Otherwise, when (4) is violated, the
optimal exible contract is characterized by w2 > w2 and by a lower variability than in
(3) of the wages paid in state 1.
The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that the optimal exible contract under
imprecision aversion (and risk neutrality) qualitatively diers from the optimal one under
risk aversion (and imprecision neutrality). Under risk aversion only it is never optimal to
provide full insurance to the agent across dierent output realizations in state 2 as well
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as across states 1 and 2, while under imprecision aversion this is optimal for an open set
of parameter values. This dierence can be explained by the dierent channels through
which an agency cost appears in these two (polar) cases, as we explore next.
4.3 Dierences in beliefs and the source of agency costs
In this section we establish more formally the property mentioned in the previous sec-
tion that the variability of the agent's compensation across dierent realizations of the
uncertainty entails some costs in terms of lower social surplus. The cost of the wage
variability comes from the fact that the induced beliefs of the agent change with the wage
prole, and this `pessimism' needs to be compensated by the principal. This provides a
new channel via which the variability in the wage prole aects the agent's utility and
hence his choices, as now the ranking of the payos across states matters to determine the
induced beliefs, while this was irrelevant in the risk aversion case. Although this agency
cost could be expected, it is worth noticing that xing dierent beliefs for the agent and
the principal would lead to `speculative gains' that are absent in the present setup.
Let us start from the full insurance contract, that is the optimal contract absent any
informational asymmetries. This contract insures the worker within each state  as well
as across states. It has w1 = w1 = u+ cx and w2 = w2 = u+ cy. We show in what follows
that any deviation (d w1; dw1; d w2; dw2) from this contract which satises the participation
constraint decreases the principal's prots when imprecision is not degenerate.
The change in expected cost for the principal is equal to
p^[^(x; 1)d w1 + (1  ^(x; 1))dw1] + (^(y; 2)d w2 + (1  ^(y; 2)))dw2:
Consider then the following deviation from the full insurance contract: d w1 > 0, dw1 < 0,
d w2 > 0 and dw2 < 0 so that
(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))d w2 + (1  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2))dw2 >
(^(x; 1)  (x; 1))d w1 + (1  ^(x; 1) + (x; 1))dw1
i.e., the agent is now better o in state 2 than in 1. As a consequence, the agent
now evaluates the occurrence of 1 with the least favorable distribution, i.e., p^ + (p).
Similarly, he uses ^(x; 1)   (x; 1) to evaluate, within state 1; the probability of R,
conditionally on doing action x, and ^(y; 2)   (y; 2) to evaluate, within state 2 the
probability of R, conditionally on doing action y. Having pinned down the beliefs induced
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by this deviation, we can compute the eect of this change in compensation on the agent's
participation constraint. Dierentiating the expression of this constraint in (PC? ), using
these beliefs, yields:
p^[^(x; 1)d w1 + (1  ^(x; 1))dw1] + (1  p^)[^(y; 2)d w2 + (1  ^(y; 2))dw2]+
[p^(x; 1)(dw1   d w1) + (1  p^)(y; 2)(dw2   d w2)]+
(p)[(^(x; 1)  (x; 1))d w1 + (1  ^(x; 1) + (x; 1))dw1 
(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))d w2   (1  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2))dw2]  0
(5)
The term in the rst line equals, as we saw above, the change in the wage cost for
the principal. The other two terms reect the change in the agent's utility due to the
change in his induced beliefs, which in turn reect the eect of imprecision and imprecision
aversion: if in fact (x; 1) = (y; 2) = (p) = 0 (which occurs, for instance, if  = 0;
that is, if the agent is imprecision neutral), or if there is altogether no imprecision (i.e.,
information is suciently precise so that the set of distributions describing the situation
is reduced to a singleton), the terms appearing in the second to the fourth line in (5) are
all zero. When imprecision matters, the term appearing on the second line is negative,
given the signs of the change in the agent's wage that is considered. The last term, on
the third and fourth line, is negative as well since this change implies that the utility in
state 2 is higher than in state 1. Hence, for the participation constraint to still hold
((5) to be satised) it has to be the case when imprecision matters) that the term on the
rst line is positive, that is, that the principal's prots decrease as a result of the change
in wage considered.
The deviation contemplated above generates a higher utility level in state 2 than in
1 as well as, in each  state, for the high income realization. This pins down the induced
beliefs that appear in the agent's participation constraint. The same type of reasoning can
be applied for any other deviation from the full insurance contract: the induced beliefs
will be dierent but expected costs increase anyway. Since we know that a constant level
of wages in state 1 violates incentive compatibility and hence some variability in wages
is needed, we therefore conclude that there exists an agency cost.21
This cost is due to the pessimistic beliefs on the agent's side, which tend to underweigh
{ compared to the principal's beliefs { the realization of the good outcome R. These beliefs
are induced by the variability in wages in state 1, necessary to lead the agent to choose
21This cost could be zero in some special cases.
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action x in that state. This lower valuation by the agent of the compensation received
forces the principal to raise it, compared to what he would do absent any informational
asymmetries, in order to fulll the participation constraint.
What this analysis also shows is that, in line with the no trade results present in the
literature on ambiguity aversion (see, e.g., Billot et al. (2000), Strzalecki and Werner
(2011)) it is never optimal to induce dierent beliefs between the agent and the principal,
unless it is required to do so in order to satisfy the incentive constraints. And in this
setting such dierence in beliefs never increases the surplus to be split between the two
parties. This is in stark contrast with a situation in which the principal and the agent have
xed and dierent probabilistic beliefs that do not depend on the contract considered.
To better understand the role played by this heterogeneity in beliefs between principal
and agent induced by imprecision aversion, it is useful to examine the case where the
beliefs of principal and agent are xed at this induced level. Consider in particular the
contract described in (3): the principal uses beliefs ^(x; 1) while the agent uses (x; 1).
On the other hand, the beliefs of the agent over 1 and on R conditionally on being in
state 2 and on doing action y are not pinned down and could be set equal to those used by
the principal, p^ and ^(y; 2). However when the agent and the principal have exogenously
xed beliefs set at this level ((x; 1); p^; ^(y; 2) for the agent and ^(x; 1); p^; ^(y; 2)
for the principal), the contract considered is never optimal: a higher level of expected
prots can in fact be attained by reducing the volatility of the payment in the 1 state
and increasing that in 2 and across the  states. This stands in stark contrast to the
imprecision aversion case, where the contract described is optimal when (4) holds. The
reason is precisely because the deviation described above would induce a change in the
agent's beliefs which would make the deviation no longer protable.
4.4 Flexible vs rigid contracts under imprecision aversion
We can then again compare the optimal exible contract to the rigid contracts. In par-
ticular, we analyze how the relative protability of the two varies with respect to the
parameters describing the imprecision aversion () and the agents' imprecision {as cap-
tured by the width of the intervals describing the possible probability beliefs.
Whenever the optimal exible contract is given by (3), it is fairly easy to verify22 that
expected prots are strictly decreasing in  as well as in the agents' imprecision. Since
22Details are in the Appendix.
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expected prots at the optimal rigid contracts are independent of  we obtain:
Corollary 2 Under (4) the relative protability of exible over rigid contracts is always
decreasing in the agent's degree of imprecision aversion  as well as in the imprecision of
the return to action x in state 1.
Hence, we can say that the comparative statics eects of increasing risk aversion and
imprecision aversion on the performance of exible versus rigid contract go in the same
direction, even though we remarked after Proposition 3 that the optimal exible contracts
do dier under these two specications.
5 Concluding remarks
Starting from Dow and Werlang (1992) a strand of literature has shown how ambiguity
(or imprecision) and ambiguity aversion can deliver qualitatively dierent predictions
from models embedding risk and risk aversion only. The present paper contributes to
this literature in the framework of a contracting problem,23 where a principal considers
delegating some tasks to an agent in a situation where the environment may appear as
relatively `new' or uncertain to both parties. The possible benets of delegation stem
from the fact that the agent has some superior information, as he receives a private signal
regarding the relative protability of the various actions which can be undertaken, but
the agent's action choice is not observable by the principal.
We established that imprecision aversion leads, under certain conditions, to the fol-
lowing properties of a exible (delegation) contract: the compensation paid to the agent
is such that the agent is fully insured against dierent realizations of the signal he receives
as well as against dierent levels of the output resulting from the agent's action in some
states. In contrast, this is never the case under risk aversion, where variability across
signal realizations as well as across output realizations is the rule. We also showed that
the higher the agent's risk aversion is, the more expensive the use of a exible contract
proves for the principal. Hence we shall observe rigid contracts being adopted more often
in this case as the latter are not aected by risk aversion. An analogous result obtains
under imprecision aversion, in spite of the dierent features of the exible contracts in
23See e.g. for previous studies, Mukerji (1998) and Mukerji and Tallon (2004)
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the two cases, described above, and the fact that the agent is fully insured against vari-
ous realizations of the uncertainty: when imprecision aversion is higher, the prots of a
principal adopting a exible contract are lower and hence the use of a rigid contract may
become preferable.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is decomposed into three Propositions (A.1 to A.3)
Proposition A.1: At an optimal exible contract the compensation exhibits the
following properties: w1  w2  w2  w1; and w1 > w1. Furthermore:
(i) if w2 > w1, then w1 > w2 and (IC3) and (IC4) are binding, while (IC1), (IC2),
(IC5) and (IC6) are slack.
(ii) if w2 = w1, then w1 = w2 and (IC3) binds, while (IC1), (IC2), and (IC4)
are automatically satised ((IC1) and (IC4) as equalities), and (IC5) and (IC6) are
slack.24
Proof.
Step 1: At an optimal solution w2  w2.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, w2 < w2.
Then, it is immediate to show, given that cy < cx, (y; 1) < (x; 1), and (y; 2) <
(x; 2), that both (IC1) and (IC5) are slack. Start with (IC1): the right hand side of
(IC1) is strictly greater than the right hand side of (IC3) and hence, (IC1) is slack. For
(IC5), rewrite the constraint as:
[(y; 2)e
 a w2 + (1  (y; 2))e aw2 ]eacy  [(x; 2)e a w2 + (1  (x; 2))e aw2 ]eacx
Then, under the assumption, the expression in bracket in the left hand side is strictly
smaller than the one in the right hand side, which implies, together with the order on the
cost, that (IC5) is slack.
We now show that if w2 < w2, then it is possible to nd an improvement for the
principal by pushing w2 and w2 closer. Consider  w2 > 0 and w2 < 0 (i.e. a discrete
change in w2; w2) such that:
(i) (y; 2)e
 a( w2+ w2 cy) + (1   (y; 2))e a(w2+w2 cy) = (y; 2)e a( w2 cy) + (1  
(y; 2))e
 a(w2 cy) and,
(ii) (y; 2) w2 + (1  (y; 2))w2 < 0
24The argument shows that the stated result holds whenever the agent's utility function can be decom-
posed as u(w   c) = u(w)u( c) with u (strictly) concave and increasing (i.e. not only for , CARA).
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Note that it is possible to nd such a  w2 and w2 by concavity of the utility function.
By condition (ii), we can conclude that this change improves the principal's prot. It re-
mains to show that it is feasible and satises the remaining incentive and the participation
constraints.
(IC2) is trivially satised since it does not depend on  w2 and w2. (IC4) and (IC6)
are satised by construction, given condition (i) and the same is true for (PC). Thus,
it remains to show that (IC3) holds. Given that the left hand side of (IC3) remains
unchanged, it is enough to show that:
(y; 1)e
 a( w2 cy)+(1 (y; 1))e a(w2 cy)  (y; 1)e a( w2+ w2 cy)+(1 (y; 1))e a(w2+w2 cy)
This follows from condition (i) and the fact that (y; 1) < (y; 2). Indeed, (i) is equiv-
alent to (y; 2)[e
 a( w2+ w2)   e a w2 ] + (1   (y; 2))[e a(w2+w2)   e aw2 ] = 0. The rst
term is negative while the second is positive, so we have, given that (y; 1) < (y; 2),
(y; 1)[e
 a( w2+ w2)  e a w2 ]+ (1 (y; 1))[e a(w2+w2)  e aw2 ] > 0, which yields the
desired result. 
Step 2: At an optimal solution w1 > w1.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of (IC2). 
Step 3: At an optimal solution (IC3) binds.
Proof. We distinguish two cases, according to whether w2 = w2 or w2 < w2.
Case 1.: w2 = w2  w2.
In that event, (IC5) is automatically satised and therefore can be dropped. Further-
more, (IC3) implies (IC1) which can so also be dropped. Now, by Step 2 w1 < w1. Hence,
given that (y; 2) > (y; 1), it is possible to show that (IC3) and (IC4) imply (IC2),
which can be dropped.
Obviously, (IC3) and (IC6) cannot be simultaneously binding. We show next that
(IC3) has to bind and therefore (IC6) is slack. Assume not, i.e., (IC3) is slack and
consider (an innitesimal change) d w1 < 0, dw1 = 0 and dw2 > 0. Since (IC3) is
slack, for suciently small such quantities it continues to hold. (IC4) and (IC6) remain
satised. Choosing d w1 =   (1 p)e
 a(w2 cy)
p(x;1)e a( w1 cx)
dw2 ensures that the participation constraint
continues to hold. By construction, the change in the objective function is equal to
(1   p)
h
e a(w2 cy)
e a( w1 cx)   1
i
dw2. Given that dw2 > 0, this quantity is positive (hence leading
to an increase in the objective function) if e a(w2 cy) > e a( w1 cx), that is if w1 > w2+c.
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This property always holds in the case under consideration (w2 = w2): (IC3) can in fact
be rewritten as follows:
(x; 1)e
 a w1 + (1  (x; 1))e aw1  e a(w2+c);
which in turn implies, together with the property w1 > w1 established in Step 2, that
e a w1 < e a(w2+c); and therefore w1 > w2 +c.
Hence, whenever (IC3) is slack we can nd a perturbation of the wage bill that increases
the principal's prot, contradicting optimality of the contract. Therefore (IC3) has to bind
(and hence (IC6) is slack).
Case 2.: w2 < w2.
Assume (IC3) is slack and consider a discrete change w2 > 0 and  w2 < 0 such that:
(i) (y; 2) w2+(1 (y; 2)w2 < 0 and (ii) (y; 2)e a( w2+ w2)+(1 (y; 2))e a( w2+w2) =
(y; 2)e
 a w2 + (1  (y; 2))e a w2 . Such numbers exist by strict concavity of u.
Notice that (IC2), (IC4), (IC6) and (PC) are unaected by these changes and thus
continue to hold. We now check (IC1). The left hand side is unchanged and we therefore
need to show that: (x; 1)e
 a( w2 cx)+ (1  (x; 1))e a(w2 cx)  (x; 1)e a( w2+ w2 cx)+
(1  (x; 1))e a(w2+w2 cx), which is equivalent to
(x; 1)[e
 a w2   e a( w2+ w2)] + (1  (x; 1))[e aw2   e a(w2+w2)]  0
But this holds as a consequence of (ii), given that w2 > 0 and  w2 < 0 and (x; 1) >
(y; 2). Thus, (IC1) continues to hold.
It remains to check (IC5). By construction, the left hand side is unaected by the
change. Given that (x; 2) > (y; 2), one can replicate the argument showing that (IC1)
holds to prove that (IC5) holds as well. 
Step 4: At an optimal solution (IC6) is slack.
Proof. Given that w2  w2 and (y; 2)  (y; 1), we have
(y; 2)e
 a( w2 cy)+(1 (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)  (y; 1)e a( w2 cy)+(1 (y; 1))e a(w2 cy).
From the previous step, we know (IC3) is binding, and hence
(y; 2)e
 a( w2 cy) + (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)  (x; 1)e a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)
Given that w1 > w1 and (x; 1)  (x; 2), this establishes that (IC6) is slack, i.e.
(y; 2)e
 a( w2 cy) + (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy) < (x; 2)e a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 2))e a(w1 cx)
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Step 5: At an optimal solution (IC5) is slack.
Proof. If w2 = w2, this is obvious. Consider next the case w2 > w2. Then, (y; 2)e
 a( w2 cy)+
(1 (y; 2))e a(w2 cy)  (y; 1)e a( w2 cy)+(1 (y; 1))e a(w2 cy). From Step 3 we know
that (IC2) binds, i.e., (y; 1)e
 a( w2 cy) + (1   (y; 1))e a(w2 cy) = (x; 1)e a( w1 cx) +
(1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx).
Now, by (IC1), (x; 1)e
 a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)  (x; 1)e a( w2 cx) + (1 
(x; 1))e
 a(w2 cx) and hence, since w2 > w2 and (x; 1) > (x; 2), (x; 1)e
 a( w1 cx) +
(1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) < (x; 2)e a( w2 cx) + (1  (x; 2))e a(w2 cx). As a consequence,
(y; 2)e
 a( w2 cy) + (1  (y; 2))e a(w2 cy) < (x; 2)e a( w2 cx) + (1  (x; 2))e a(w2 cx)
showing that (IC5) is slack. 
Step 6: At an optimal solution, w1  w2 and w1  w2. Furthermore, if w1 = w2, then
it must be the case that w1 = w2.
Proof. Rewrite (IC1) and (IC4) as follows:
(x; 1)

e a w1   e a w2  (1  (x; 1)) e aw2   e aw1 (6)
(y; 2)

e a w2   e a w1  (1  (y; 2)) e aw1   e aw2 (7)
Assume w1 < w2, then (6) implies that w1 > w2 and (6) and (7) yield that:
(x; 1)
1  (x; 1) 
e aw2   e aw1
e a w1   e a w2 
(y; 2)
1  (y; 2)
But this is not possible given that (y; 2) < (x; 1). Hence, w1  w2. A similar
argument establishes that w1  w2.
Finally, suppose that w1 = w2. Then, using the fact that (IC3) is binding, one can
rewrite (IC2) as follows:
(y; 1)e
 a( w2 cy) + (1  (y; 1))e a(w2 cy)  (y; 1)e a( w1 cy) + (1  (y; 1))e a(w1 cy)
which yields w1 = w2, since we assumed that w1 = w2 and we proved above that w1 
w2. 
Step 7: At an optimal solution (IC2) is slack if w1 < w2. If w1 = w2, (IC2) is
automatically satised as equality.
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Proof. Use (IC3), which is binding, to rewrite (IC2) as follows:
(y; 1)e
 a( w2 cy) + (1  (y; 1))e a(w2 cy)  (y; 1)e a( w1 cy) + (1  (y; 1))e a(w1 cy)
(8)
If w1 < w2, (8) is equivalent, given that w1  w2, to
e a w2   e a w1
e aw1   e aw2 
1  (y; 1)
(y; 1)
But we know by (IC4) that
e a w2   e a w1
e aw1   e aw2 
1  (y; 2)
(y; 2)
and hence, since (y; 1) < (y; 2), (IC2) is slack.
If w1 = w2, then we know that w1 = w2 and (8) - hence (IC2) - is automatically
satised. 
Step 8: At an optimal solution (IC1) and (IC4) cannot be simultaneously binding if
w1 < w2. If w1 = w2 they are both automatically satised (as equalities).
Proof. Assume w1 < w2 and observe that if (IC1) and (IC4) were binding, one would
have
1  (x; 1)
(x; 1)
=
e a w2   e a w1
e aw1   e aw2 =
1  (y; 2)
(y; 2)
a contradiction. 
Step 9: At an optimal solution, if w1 < w2 (IC4) binds.
Proof. Assume w1 < w2 and (IC4) is slack and consider changing w1 and w1 by
respectively  w1 < 0 and w1 > 0 such that, (i) (x; 1) w1 + (1   (x; 1))w1 < 0
and (ii), (x; 1)e
 a( w1+ w1)+(1 (x; 1))e a(w1+w1) = (x; 1)e a w1+(1 (x; 1))e aw1 .
Such a change exists by strict concavity of the utility function and provides higher prot
to the principal.
Furthermore, this change does not aect (IC1), (IC3), and (PC) and is feasible given
that (IC2), (IC4), (IC5) and (IC6) are slack. Hence, (IC4) has to be binding at an optimal
solution whenever w1 < w2. 
Steps 1-9 complete the proof of Proposition A.1. From this result it then immediately
follows:
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Corollary A.1: The optimal exible contract can be obtained as a solution to the simpler
programme below:
max w1;w1; w2;w2 p[(x; 1)(
R  w1) + (1  (x; 1))(R  w1)]
+(1  p)[(y; 2)( R  w2) + (1  (y; 2))(R  w2)]
s.t.8<:
(IC3); (IC4); (PC) (as stated in (P flex)) and
(WI) w1  w2
(WII) w2  w2
(P flex;R)
Observe the constraint w2  w1 is implied by (WI) and (IC4).
Proposition A.2: Under Assumption 1, 2, there exists a solution to problem
(P flex;R) (and hence also to (P flex)).
Proof. The two binding constraints (IC3) and (IC4) enable one to solve for z1 = e
 a w1
and z1  e aw1 as a function of z2  e a w2 and z2  e aw2 , yielding:
z1 =
 
(1  (y; 2))[(y; 1)z2 + (1  (y; 1))z2]e ac   (1  (x; 1))[(y; 2)z2 + (1  (y; 2))z2]

(x; 1)  (y; 2)
z1 =
 
(x1)[(y; 2)z2 + (1  (y; 2))z2]  (y; 2)[(y; 1)z2 + (1  (y; 1))z2]e ac

(x; 1)  (y; 2)
We now want to establish that under the condition 1 (y;1)
1 (x;1)  eac, it is possible to
nd 0  z2  z2 such that:
z1 > 0
z1  z2
z2  z1
z2  z2
These inequalities ensure that values of the wages satisfying w1  w2  w2  w1 can be
found.
The rst inequality is equivalent, under the condition 1 (y;1)
1 (x;1)  eac; to
(1  (x; 1))(y; 2)  (1  (y; 2))(y; 1)e ac
(1  (y; 2))[(1  (y; 1))e ac   (1  (x; 1))] <
z2
z2
(9)
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The next two inequalities are actually equivalent (again under the condition 1 (y;1)
1 (x;1) 
eac) to the same inequality:
(x; 1)  (y; 1)e ac
(1  (y; 1))e ac   (1  (x; 1)) 
z2
z2
(10)
Thus, to show that we can nd some values z2; z2 satisfying the last inequality, z2  z2;
and such that (9) and (10) hold, we need to establish that the following holds:
max

1;
(1  (x; 1))(y; 2)  (1  (y; 2))(y; 1)e ac
(1  (y; 2))[(1  (y; 1))e ac   (1  (x; 1))]

<
(x; 1)  (y; 1)e ac
(1  (y; 1))e ac   (1  (x; 1))
Straightforward computation shows that, under the assumption that 1 (y;1)
1 (x;1)  eac;
this is indeed the case.
Before solving problem (P flex;R), observe that one can rewrite it, with the following
change of variables z = e aw, as a problem with a (strictly) concave objective and linear
constraints:
maxz1;z1;z2;z2 p[(x; 1)(
R + log z1
a
) + (1  (x; 1))(R + log z1a )]
+(1  p)[(y; 2)( R + log z2a ) + (1  (y; 2))(R + log z2a )]8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(IC30) (x; 1)eacxz1 + (1  (x; 1))eacxz1 = (y; 1)eacy z2 + (1  (y; 1))eacyz2
(IC40) (y; 2)eacy z2 + (1  (y; 2))eacyz2 = (y; 2)eacy z1 + (1  (y; 2))eacyz1
(PC 0) p[(x; 1)eacxz1 + (1  (x; 1))eacxz1]+
(1  p)[(y; 2)eacy z2 + (1  (y; 2))eacyz2]  e au
(WI 0) z1  z2
(WII 0) z2  z2
( eP flex;R)
Proposition A.3: At a solution to the program ( eP flex;R), (PC 0) binds. Further-
more, we have that w2 > w2.
Proof. Consider the program ( eP flex;R). Let 3, 4, PC , I , and II denote the La-
grange multipliers associated to the constraints of this problem. The rst order conditions
obtained by dierentiating the Lagrangean with respect to z1; z2; z2; z1 are then:
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(i) p(x;1)
az1
= 3(x; 1)e
acx   4(y; 2)eacy + PCp(x; 1)eacx + I
(ii) p(1 (x;1))
az1
= 3(1  (x; 1))eacx   4(1  (y; 2))eacy
+PCp(1  (x; 1))eacx
(iii) (1 p)(y;2)
az2
=  3(y; 1)eacy + 4(y; 2)eacy
+PC(1  p)(y; 2)eacy   I + II
(iv) (1 p)(1 (y;2))
az2
=  3(1  (y; 1))eacy + 4(1  (y; 2))eacy
+PC(1  p)(1  (y; 2))eacy   II
Multiplying each equation by the appropriate z variable, adding the four equations of
the above system and using the fact that (IC30) and (IC40), in the above specication of
the optimization problem, are written as equalities, yields the following:
1
a
= PC [p(x; 1)e
acxz1 + p(1  (x; 1))eacxz1
+(1  p)(y; 2)eacy z2 + (1  p)(1  (y; 2))eacyz2] + I [z1   z2] + II [z2   z2]
Using the complementarity slackness condition, we get that I [z1  z2] = II [z2 z2] =
0. Hence PC > 0, which establishes that (PC
0) binds. Hence, we can conclude from the
expression above that PC =
eau
a
.
Next we want to show that w2 > w2 or equivalently z2 > z2. Assume to the contrary
that z2 = z2  z2. We know in that case that (WI 0) is slack (otherwise by (IC40) all
wages would have to be equal, but this would contradict the fact that (IC30) binds) and
hence I = 0. Rewrite now FOC's (iii) and (iv) as:8>>>>><>>>>>:
(iii) (1 p)
az2
=  3 (y;1)(y;2)eacy + 4eacy + PC(1  p)eacy + II(y;2)
(iv) (1 p)
az2
=  3 1 (y;1)1 (y;2)eacy + 4eacy + PC(1  p)eacy   II1 (y;2)
This implies that
 3(y; 1)
(y; 2)
eacy +
II
(y; 2)
=  31  (y; 1)
1  (y; 2)e
acy   II
1  (y; 2)
or, after some simplication,
II = ((y; 1)  (y; 2))3eacy
Note that ((y; 1)   (y; 2)) < 0 and hence II  0 i 3  0. Next observe that
(PC 0) as an equality together with (IC30) imply, if z2 = z2  z2; that z2 = e a(cy+u).
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Plug now the values of PC and z2 into equations (iii) and (iv) and use the expression
for II obtained above. The two equations are identical and yield 4 = 3  .
We have so a system of four equations { FOC's (i) and (ii), (IC30) and (IC40) { to
determine three variables: , z1 and z1. (IC3
0) and (IC40) can be used to solve directly
for z1 and z1. Now, the two FOC's can be rewritten:
p(x; 1) = az1((x; 1)e
acx   (y; 2)eacy) + eauz1p(x; 1)eacx
p(1  (x; 1)) = az1((1  (x; 1))eacx   (1  (y; 2))eacy) + eauz1p(1  (x; 1))eacx
Adding these two equations yields an equation
p = a [z1((x; 1)e
acx + z1(1  (x; 1))eacx   (y; 2)z1eacy   z1(1  (y; 2))eacy ] +
+peau [z1(x; 1)e
acx + z1(1  (x; 1))eacx ]
which, using (IC30) and (IC40) can be rewritten as:
p = a

eacye a(cy+u)   eacye a(cy+u)+ peau eacye a(cy+u) = p eacye acy = p
always satised, so that one of the two above equations can be dropped. The remaining
one can be used to solve for . Recall that   0 is needed to ensure that II  0.
Solving then (IC30) and (IC40) with respect to z1 and z1 we get:
z1 =
(x; 1)e
 a(cy+u)   (y; 2)e a(cx+u)
(x; 1)  (y; 2)
z1 =
(1  (y; 2))e a(cx+u)   (1  (x; 1))e a(cy+u)
(x; 1)  (y; 2) :
Substituting into the rst of the two FOC's above yields:
p(x; 1) =[a((x; 1)e
acx   (y; 2)eacy) + eaup(x; 1)eacx ]
 (1  (y; 2))e
 a(cx+u)   (1  (x; 1))e a(cy+u)
(x; 1)  (y; 2)
and hence
a((x; 1)e
acx   (y; 2)eacy)(1  (y; 2))e
 a(cx+u)   (1  (x; 1))e a(cy+u)
(x; 1)  (y; 2) (11)
= p(x; 1)  p(x; 1)eacx (1  (y; 2))e
 acx   (1  (x; 1))e acy
(x; 1)  (y; 2) =
= p(x; 1)

(1  (x; 1))eac   (1  (y; 2)) + (x; 1)  (y; 2)
(x; 1)  (y; 2)

=
= p(x; 1)

(1  (x; 1))(eac   1)
(x; 1)  (y; 2)

> 0
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Since the coecient of  in the rst term is positive, it follows that the solution for 
of such equation is > 0, a contradiction. Hence, it cannot be that z2 = z2.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The rst best optimal contract is obtained as solution of the problem of maximizing the
principal's expected prots subject to the agent's participation constraint, which under
risk neutrality takes the following form:
max w1;w1; w2;w2 p[(x; 1)(
R  w1) + (1  (x; 1))(R  w1)]
+(1  p)[(y; 2)( R  w2) + (1  (y; 2))(R  w2)]
s.t.
p[(x; 1) w1 + (1  (x; 1))w1   cx]+
(1  p)[(y; 2) w2 + (1  (y; 2))w2   cy]  u
The maximal level of the principal's expected prots that can be attained at a solution
of this problem is then clearly the one stated in the proposition and it is immediate to
verify that the compensation prole given in (1) yields such level of expected prots and
is then a rst best optimum. It remains thus to verify the values in (1) satisfy all the
incentive compatibility constraints, which under risk neutrality take the following form:
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(x; 1) w1 + (1  (x; 1))w1  (x; 1) w2 + (1  (x; 1))w2
(x; 1) w1 + (1  (x; 1))w1   cx  (y; 1) w1 + (1  (y; 1))w1   cy
(x; 1) w1 + (1  (x; 1))w1   cx  (y; 1) w2 + (1  (y; 1))w2   cy
(y; 2) w2 + (1  (y; 2))w2  (y; 2) w1 + (1  (y; 2))w1
(y; 2) w2 + (1  (y; 2))w2   cy  (x; 2) w2 + (1  (x; 2))w2   cx
(y; 2) w2 + (1  (y; 2))w2   cy  (x; 2) w1 + (1  (x; 2))w1   cx
(12)
This is immediate by direct substitution. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
We rst consider a local deviation from the contract specied in (3) such that dw1 > 0
and such that (IC3), (IC4) and (PC) continue to hold as equalities. We conjecture,
and verify below, that the sign of the changes in the other wage variables is as follows,
d w1 < 0, d w2 > 0, and dw2 < 0, and in the agent's expected utility in the two  states is
du(1) < 0, du(2) > 0. That is, the agent is no longer fully insured in state 2 nor across
states 1 and 2, which xes his `beliefs' in the incentive and participation constraints.
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Dierentiating (IC3), (IC4) and (PC), written as equalities, with respect to w1; w1; w2; w2,
and solving these equations for d w1, d w2; dw2; as a function of dw1 > 0 yields:
d w1 =
"
 1
(p^ + (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^  (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))
+ 1
#
dw1 (13)
d w2 =
"
1  ^(x; 1)  (x; 1)  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2) + [^(y; 1)  (y; 1)  ^(x; 1) + (x; 1)][^(y; 2)  (y; 2)]
[(p^ + (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^  (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))][^(y; 1)  (y; 1)  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2)]
#
dw1
dw2 =
"
1  [^(y; 1)  (y; 1)  ^(x; 1) + (x; 1)][^(y; 2)  (y; 2)]
[(p^ + (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^  (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))][^(y; 1)  (y; 1)  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2)]
#
dw1
It is immediate to verify from the above expressions that the sign of the changes is the
one conjectured.
The change in the principal's prot is given by
 fp^ [^(x; 1)d w1 + (1  ^(x; 1))dw1] + (1  p^) [^(y; 2)d w2 + (1  ^(y; 2))dw2]g
Substituting for d w1; d w2; dw2 the expressions found in (13) yields:
  1 + p^^(x; 1) + (1  p^)^(y; 2)
[(p^ + (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^  (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))]
+(1  p^) [^(x; 1)  (x; 1)  ^(y; 1) + (y; 1)](y; 2)
[(p^ + (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^  (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))][^(y; 1)  (y; 1)  ^(y; 2) + (y; 2)]
	
dw1
Since dw1 > 0 the above term is negative, that is the deviation considered is not protable
if and only if the term appearing in curly brackets is positive, that is (4) holds.
The other possible deviation, with dw1 < 0; can be treated in a similar fashion. The
wage changes have here the opposite sign as above, hence the induced beliefs need to be
modied accordingly. The expression for the change in expected prots in that case is
then:
  1  p^^(x; 1) + (1  p^)^(y; 2)
[(p^  (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^ + (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))]
 (1  p^) ^(y; 2)[^(y; 1) + (y; 1)  2(y; 2)  ^(x; 1)  (x; 1)]
[(p^  (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^ + (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))][^(y; 1) + (y; 1)  ^(y; 2)  (y; 2)]
 (1  p^)  (^(y; 2)  (y; 2))(^(y; 1) + (y; 1)) + (^(y; 2) + (y; 2))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1))
[(p^  (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^ + (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))][^(y; 1) + (y; 1)  ^(y; 2)  (y; 2)]
	
dw1
The principal would benet from this deviation only if the term appearing in curly
brackets is negative (as in this case dw1 < 0). This term is negative if and only if
(^(y; 2) + (y; 2)  ^(y; 1)  (y; 1))
[(p^  (p))(^(x; 1)  (x; 1)) + (1  p^  (p))(^(y; 2)  (y; 2))] 
(1  p^)(y; 2)[^(x; 1)  (x; 1)  ^(y; 1)  (y; 1)] > 0
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It can be shown that the expression on the left hand side of the above inequality is
bounded above by
 (x; 1)p^(^(y; 2)+(y; 2) ^(y; 1) (y; 1)) (1 p^)(y; 2)[^(x; 1) (x; 1) ^(y; 2) (y; 2)]
which is always negative. Hence, the considered deviation is never optimal.
We now prove that at an optimal exible contract we have w2 > w2 if condition (4)
does not hold. Note rst that w2 < w2 cannot be part of a solution, since it would then
pay for the principal to reduce the volatility in w2. Assume hence that (4) does not hold
and that w2 = w2.
Given that w2 is constant, (IC

1) is implied by (IC

3) and (IC

5) always holds. Observe
next that (IC?3) holds with equality since otherwise one could increase the principal's
prot by lowering wages in state 1 while increasing w2 in a way that preserves (IC

2) and
(PC) (as well as (IC4) and (IC

6)). This implies that the agent's expected utility is the
same in state 1 and in state 2.
Furthermore, (IC3) binding implies that (IC

6) is slack and, together with (IC

4), that
(IC2) holds. Now, if (IC

4) were slack, it would be possible to lower w1 and increase w1
so that the expected utility of the agent in state 1 is constant while the prot for the
principal increases.
Hence, if w2 constant is to be part of the solution, (IC

4) has to bind. But then,
the optimal contract is the one specied in (3) (that satises (IC3), (IC

4) and (PC
) as
equality with w2 constant), and we just proved that it is not optimal when condition (4)
does not hold. Hence the contradiction: when (4) does not hold, it has to be the case
that w2 is non constant.

Proof of Corollary 2.
For the open set of parameter values for which the contract described in (3) is the
optimal exible contract, the expected wage bill the principal has to pay is
p^(u^+ cx) + (1  p^)(u+ cy) + p^ (x; 1)
^(x; 1)  ^(y; 2)  ((x; 1)  (y; 2))c
Recall that (x; 1) = 
(x;1) (x;1)
2
and (y; 2) = 
(y;2) (y;2)
2
and substitute these
terms in the above expression. If we then dierentiate the above expression with respect
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to  we readily see that the expected wage bill is always increasing in . Increasing the
degree of imprecision aversion will therefore lower expected prots at the exible contract.
The same is clearly true for increases in the imprecision of the return to action x in state
1, that is of the width of the interval [(x; 1)  (x; 1)].
Further results for the numerical example of Section 3.3
The eect of risk aversion on wage and utility dierentials
We illustrate the implications that the level of the agent's degree of risk aversion has
for the specic properties of the optimal exible contract. Figure 2 describes the eect
of varying a on the spread between the compensation paid for the high and low output
realizations at the optimal exible contract respectively in state 1 (i.e. w1 w1) and 2.
Figure 3 shows then the eect on the utility dierential. We see that both the spread in
state 1 and the utility dierential vary non monotonically with a, rst increasing and
then decreasing.
INCLUDE FIGURE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
We should point out however that these properties - unlike the eect on the relative
protability of exible and rigid contracts displayed in Figure 1 - are not quite robust to
changes in the values of the parameters considered in Table 1. For dierent parameter
values, other patterns of the utility and the wage dierential, for instance monotonically
decreasing in state 1; may obtain.
The eect of actions' productivity and cost
We investigate next how the relative protability of exible versus rigid contracts is af-
fected by the following parameters: the levels of the probability of success for each action
and event in which it is undertaken and the cost of the dierent types of actions cz. Our
ndings, still based on the parametrization described in Table 1, are summarized in Table
2. A + (resp. -) sign indicates that an increase in the parameter value indicated in the
top of the column always increases (decreases) the variable appearing in the row, while a
? indicates the eect is ambiguous, not always of the same sign.
For instance, the rst column reports the sign of the eects of increasing (x; 1),
within the interval indicated, [:75; :9] on the following variables: (i) the dierential between
the expected prots at the optimal exible contract and those at the x rigid contract in
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Parameter (x; 1) (x; 2) (y; 1) (y; 2) cx cy
Range [.75,.9] [.35,.55] [.15,.25] [.3,.5] [1.2,1.8] [.7,1.25]
Prot exible - prot x +     + ? ?
Prot exible - prot y + =       +
w1   w1   = + ? +  
w2   w2   =   + +  
u(2)  u(1)   =   + +  
Table 2: Comparative statics with respect to probabilities and costs
the rst row and at the y rigid contract in the second row; (ii) the spread between the
compensation paid for the high and low realization of the output when state 1 occurs
in the third row and when 2 occurs in the fourth one; (iii) the dierence in expected
utility in the two states. All this when the other parameters are kept xed at the values
indicated in Table 1.
In particular, we nd that the protability of the exible contract, relative to both rigid
contracts, increases if (x; 1) (probability of success with action x in state 1) increases,
or (y; 1) decreases. Such changes increase the productivity of the costlier action (x)
relative to the less costly one in state 1 as well as the variance of the productivity of
each action across the dierent states. The same eects are obtained with a decrease in
(x; 2), reducing the dierence between the productivity of actions x and y in state 2.
We also see that the variability in the compensation paid in state 2, where the less
costly action is implemented, always moves in the same direction as the utility dierential
u(2) u(1), suggesting these two are complementary instruments to address the incentive
problems generated by the private information over , as already mentioned in Remark
2.
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Online Appendix { NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN PRINTED
VERSION
Proposition B.1: When  is commonly observable, under Assumption 2 the opti-
mal contract still implements actions x and y and is characterized as follows:
e a w1 =
(1  (y; 1))e a(u+cx)   (1  (x; 1))e a(u+cy)
(x; 1)  (y; 1)
e aw1 =
(x; 1)e
 a(u+cy)   (y; 1)e a(u+cx)
(x; 1)  (y; 1)
w2 = w2 = u+ cy
Thus the agent's expected utility is the same in 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition B.1. Observe rst that (IC2) implies that w1 > w1. The
property w2 = w2 can then be easily veried and ensures that (IC5) is always satised.
Consider then the rst order conditions of problem of maximizing the principal's expected
revenue subject to (IC2), and (PC):258>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(i)  p(x; 1) + IC( a(y; 1)e a( w1 cy) + a(x; 1)e a( w1 cx))+
PCap(x; 1)e
 a( w1 cx) = 0
(ii)  p(1  (x; 1)) + IC( a(1  (y; 1))e a(w1 cy) + a(1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)+
PCap(1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) = 0
(iii)  (1  p) + (1  p)PCae a(w2 cy) = 0
where IC ; PC are the Lagrange multipliers attached to constraints (IC2), (PC).
Condition (iii) implies that PC =
ea(w2 cy)
a
> 0 and hence that (PC) is binding.
Take now the summation of (i) and (ii) and use the complementary slackness condition
(requiring that IC  (IC) = 0), to obtain:
 p+ aPCp[(x; 1)e a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx)] = 0
Using the fact that (PC) is binding, this amounts to:
 p+ aPC [e au   (1  p)e a(w2 cy)] = 0
25Rewrite (IC2) as follows
e a w1 [(x; 1)eacx   (y; 1)eacy ]  e aw1 [(1  (y; 1))eacy   (1  (x; 1))eacx ]
A necessary condition for this to hold and hence for the existence of a solution to the principal's pro-
gramme is eac  1 (y;1)1 (x;1) .
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and nally, e a(w2 cy) = e au. Using again the fact that (PC) binds, we obtain that
(x; 1)e
 a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) = e au = e a(w2 cy);
thus establishing the fact that at a solution of the above problem the utility of the agent
is the same in state 1 and 2, in contrast with the property established in Proposition 1
for the optimal exible contract when  is only privately observed by the agent. 
Proposition B.2: Assume the condition in Assumption 2.ii) is replaced by the following:
(x; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 1) > (y; 2) (or by (x; 1) > (y; 1) > (x; 2) >
(y; 2)) Then the optimal exible contract is the same as the optimal contract
obtained when  is observable. On the other hand, this not true under the condition
in Assumption 2.ii), or when (x; 2) > (x; 1) > (y; 2) > (y; 1); or (x; 2) >
(y; 2) > (x; 1) > (y; 1):
Proof of Proposition B.2
To establish the result it suces to show that the optimal exible contract obtained
in Proposition B.1 remains feasible when  is unobservable and (x; 1) > (x; 2) >
(y; 1) > (y; 2) holds, that is, it satises all the remaining constraints, (IC1, IC3, IC4,
IC6).
It follows from the proof of Proposition B.1 that the optimal contract when  is
observable satises (IC2) and the two following conditions (corresponding to (PC) when
w2 = w2 and u(1) = u(2)):
(a) (x; 1)e
 a( w1 cx) + (1  (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) = e au
(b) e a(w2 cy) = e au
(IC1), given (a) and (b), amounts to e au  e aueac, which is satised given that
c > 0.
(IC3), given (a) and (b), amounts to e au  e au, and hence also holds.
(IC4), given (b), amounts to  e au   (y; 2)e a( w1 cy) (1 (y; 2))e a(w1 cy). Us-
ing condition (a), this inequality can be equivalently written as  (x; 1)e a( w1 cx)  (1 
(x; 1))e
 a(w1 cx)   (y; 2)e a( w1 cy) (1 (y; 2))e a(w1 cy). Since (y; 1) > (y; 2)
and w1 > w1, we have  (y; 1)e a( w1 cy) (1 (y; 1))e a(w1 cy) >  (y; 2)e a( w1 cy) 
45
(1 (y; 2))e a(w1 cy), and hence, using (IC2), we get (x; 1)e a( w1 cx) (1 (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) 
 (y; 2)e a( w1 cy)   (1   (y; 2))e a(w1 cy). Given the argument above, this ensures
that (IC4) is satised. Notice that this result does not hold if, instead of the condition
(x; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 1) > (y; 2), we impose Assumption 2.ii).
(IC6), given (a) and (b), amounts to e au =  (x; 1)e a( w1 cx) (1 (x; 1))e a(w1 cx) >
 (x; 2)e a( w1 cx)   (1   (x; 2))e a(w1 cx), which is satised given that (x; 1) >
(x; 2) and w1 > w1.
We have thus shown that, when (x; 1) > (x; 2) > (y; 1) > (y; 2); the op-
timal contract for the case where  is observable is a feasible contract also when  is
unobservable. Hence it is the optimal contract also in that case.
It is immediate to verify that the same argument holds when (x; 1) > (y; 1) >
(x; 2) > (y; 2): In contrast, both (IC4) and (IC6) are violated when (x; 2) >
(x; 1) > (y; 2) > (y; 1); or (x; 2) > (y; 2) > (x; 1) > (y; 1): 
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Figure 1: Prot dierential between the exible and rigid contracts as a function of risk
aversion
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Figure 2: Wage dierentials at the optimal exible contract as a function of risk aversion
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Figure 3: Utility dierential u(2)   u(1) at the optimal exible contract as a function
of a
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